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EXTRATERRITORIAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM
COPYRIGHT ACT

Adam D. Fullert
I. Introduction
You wake up in Vegas cold and hungry, but there will be no
buffet for you today. As you look around,you realize thatyesterday
was not a dream. You are a prisoner,and the bars are cold. How
did you get here? You were sent to a convention by your employer to
give a talk about a recent computerprogramyou wrote. You gave
the talk but the next thing you remember is being handcuffed and
hauledaway to prison. Did I mention that you are in a foreign
country? No. Well you are, and everything is very, very confusing.
One can only imagine what Dmitry Sklyarov went through the
morning after the FBI arrested him. Sklyarov is a Russian national who
was arrested for writing a computer program in Russia for a Russian
company, Elcomsoft Co. Ltd.' Skylarov is the author of the Advanced
eBook Processor,a computer program allowing owners of electronic books
to print and make copies of Adobe Systems' eBook 2 Adobe encrypts its
eBooks to protect against the transferring of its digital files between users
and devices over the Internet.3 The encryption is extensive. Adobe does
not allow eBooks to be copied to or transferred between electronic devices,
including but not limited to computers, hand-held devices, and printers.
This encryption comes at a price to consumers who purchase the eBooks.
t J.D., Case Western Reserve School of Law (2003); B.S. in Finance, Miami University
(2000), The author wishes to thank Hiram E. Chodosh, Director of the Fredrick K. Cox
International Law Center, Jennifer K. McKay, Jessica M. Bulos, and Frank "Gus" A. Biggio
for their constant support and insightful comments on this Note.
1Alex Salkever, Don't Judge an eBook Case by its Coverage: A Programmer'sArrestfor
Allegedly Violating Copyright Law Has Riled Civil Libertarians. They May Have an
at
Bus.
WK.
ONLINE,
available
Unworthy
Martyr,

http://www.businessweek.comIbwdaily/inflash/Jul2001/nf20010725_818.htm
2001).

(July

25,

2 Elise Ackerman, Russian Computer ProgrammerArrested, KNIGHT-RIDDER TRIB. Bus.
NEWS, July, 18, 2001.

3 Brian Bergstein, Adobe Calls for Programmer's Release, A.P. ONLINE, July 23, 2001,
availableat 2001 WL 25486197; See also David Streitfeld, E-Book Saga Is Full of Woe - and a Bit of Intrigue, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2001, at A1.
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The encryption allows the books to be viewed only on the computer on
which they were downloaded.4 This greatly restricts the eBook owner's
ability to use the product. The owner of an eBook has to repurchase the
book every time he or she upgrades to a different computer or operating
system, 5 and the owner of an eBook is also prevented from making a hard
copy of the book on his or her home printer.
The Advanced eBook Processor was developed to overcome the
restrictions of the eBook by allowing eBook purchasers the same freedoms
a person purchasing a traditional book would have, i.e. the ability for the
eBook to travel with the owner through portable electronic devices or a
printed hard copy. The Advanced eBook Processorworks by decrypting
the encryption protection on Adobe's eBooks, creating a file that can be
used to create a backup copy of the book on a second computer or floppy
disk.
The Advanced eBook Processor is legal in Russia.6 However, the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DCMA") makes the Advanced eBook
Processorillegal in the United States ("U.S.").7 This 1998 Act criminalizes
circumvention of encryption systems, protecting a copyrighted work, its
manufacturing, offering to the public, or otherwise trafficking in any device
that is primarily designed for the circumvention of an encryption system
that protects a copyrighted work. 8 In the present case, the U.S. is
prosecuting Dmitry Sklyarov and Elcomsoft for selling, rather than
manufacturing, the Advanced eBook Processor.9 The DCMA imposes stiff
criminal penalties. Each count carries with it a maximum $500,000 fine
and five years in prison.' 0 Sklyarov was charged with five counts in the

4 Hiawatha Bray, Hacker's Arrest Decried: Russian 's is the First Criminal Case under
New U.S. Antipiracy Law, BOSTON GLOBE, July 20, 2001, at Cl.
5 Bruce Perens, Dmitry Sklyarov: Enemy or Friend?, ZDNET FROM ZDWIRE, Aug. 2001,
at: http://zdnet.com.com/2100-1107-530420.html.
6
See
Salkever,
supra
note
1,
available
at
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/jul200l/nf20010725_818.htm.; Danny O'Brian,
When your job becomes a crime, SUNDAY TIMES (London), Aug. 12, 2001, at DOORS30;
see also Robert Lemos, FBI nabs Russian expert at Def Con, ZDNet News from ZDWire,
July 17, 2001, available at 2001 WL 4733077 (stating that Russian law requires the ability
to make backup copies of software such as e-books).
7 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C.S. §§ 1201-1205 (Law. Co-op. 1994 &
Supp. 2002) [hereinafter DMCA].
' Id. § 1201(a)(1)(A) and (2)(A).

9 See Affidavit for Complaint, U.S. v. Sklyarov, No. 5 01 257, para. 20 (N.D. Cal, sworn
July
10,
2001)
[hereinafter
O'Connell
Affidavit],
available
at
http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/IUSv Sklyarov/20010707_complaint.html.
0 17 U.S.C.S § 1204 (Law Co-op 1994 & Supp. 2002).
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indictment, and was facing a twenty-five year prison term and a $2.5
million fine. 1
The United States targeted Dmitry, along with his employer, because
the Advanced eBook Processor named him as the software's copyright
holder. 12 The government claimed that U.S. law applies to Dmitry and his
employer because Elcomsoft allowed parties inside the U.S. to purchase the
program via its web site.13 Thus, the government argues, Elcomsoft availed
itself to the benefit of the U.S. 4market and should be held to U.S. laws that
condemn its product as illegal.'
Meanwhile, in the middle of this legal quandary is Dmitry Sklyarov, a
twenty-seven year old Ph.D. candidate. His situation hardly seemed fair,
since the U.S. holds him criminally liable for a program he developed as
part of his Ph.D. research. 15 After five months of detainment in the United
States, the U.S. government realized the gravity of the situation and reached
a deal with Dmitry's attorney that allowed him to return to his family in
Russia.16 The U.S. released Dmitry, allowing him to return to Russia in
exchange for a deposition and possible testimony in the case against
Elcomsoft. 17 The charges against Dmitry will be dropped assuming he
cooperates in the case against his employer.'8
This Note focuses on the extraterritorial implications of Dmitry's
arrest and the ongoing prosecution of his employer, Elcomsoft. The case
against Elcomsoft may not be seen as extraterritorial because of the nature

11Scarlet Pruitt, Grand Jury Indicts Russian Programmer, THESTANDARD.COM
www.thestandard.com/article/l0,1902,28836,00.html.
12See O'Connell Aff., supra note 9, 8d.

,

at

"aSee id. 8.
14 See id. at 20.
15Carrie Kirby, Russian Hacker, Company Indicted, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 29, 2001, at C 1.
16See Press Release, US Attorney (N. Dist. CA) On Dropping of Charges Against Dmitry
Sklyarov (Dec. 13,
2001)
[hereinafter U.S. Attorney Press Release],
at
http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/US v Elcomsoft/20011213_usattypr.html (last visited Mar.
14, 2003); See also Matthew Fordahl, Russian Programmer Defends Decision, A.P. Online,
Dec. 19, 2001, at 2001 WL 31687964 (reporting that Skylarov cut a deal that allowed him to
return to Russia). Outcry from the computer community also played a role in Dmitry's
release. The Electronic Frontier Foundation, a free speech and privacy organization cofounded by Grateful Dead lyricist John Perry Barlow and Lotus software founder Mitchell
Kapor, has been outspoken in its defense of Dmitry and Elcomsoft. Fallout From DEF
CON: The Conference, The Arrest, The Protests. . . On The Webmaster Show, Internet
Wire, July 27, 2001, at 2001 WL 23401910. Supporters of Dmitry also created their own
website at http://www.freesklyarov.org in order to drum up support for Dmitry through
petitions and rallies. Yang Yunyun, New Media: Biggest Test for Digital Copyright Act,
The Edge (Malaysia), Aug. 20, 2001, at 2001 WL 8759573.
17U.S. Attorney Press Release, supra note 16; Fordahl, supra note 16.
18U.S. Attorney Press Release, supra note 16.

CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. 35:89

of the Advanced eBook Processor over the Internet. However, the case
does hint at the growing importance extraterritoriality will have in the
digital age, and specifically regarding the protection of intellectual property
rights such as copyrights. Historically, extraterritoriality has not been a part
of copyright law, but with the passage of the DMCA this may no longer be
the case. "[T]he undisputed axiom that United States copyright law has no
extraterritorial application"' 9 may no longer hold true. This paper will also
analyze and resolve two questions. First, is the DMCA being applied
extraterritorially in the case against Elcomsoft? Second, assuming it is,
does the DMCA express a clear intent to apply extraterritorially? Section
Two takes a brief look at the history and criticisms of the DMCA. Section
Three first defines extraterritorial application of law. This section then
discusses the history behind the presumption against extraterritoriality in
U.S. law and what is needed to overcome this presumption. Section Four
narrows the focus, looking specifically at the presumption in U.S. copyright
law. Section Five discusses why the DMCA is not being applied
extraterritorially in this case by looking at jurisdiction on the Internet, and
Section Six examines why the DMCA is not clear enough in its intent to
apply extraterritorially.
II.

A BriefHistory Of the DMCA

There is no binding, uniform international copyright law that protects
the world's intellectual property rights." Instead, multilateral agreements
such as the Berne Convention2 and the TRIPs Agreement "bundle" each
nation's intellectual property laws together.23 The bundling of laws allows
each nation to retain the right to regulate intellectual property in its own
territory.
The World Intellectual Property Organization's ("WIPO")
19Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir.
1994).
20 Jane C. Ginsburg, International Copyright: From a "Bundle" of National Copyright
Laws to a SupernaturalCode?, 47 J.COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 265, 266 (2000).

21 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886
(revised July 24, 1971 and amended on Sept. 28, 1979) [hereinafter Beme Convention],
reprinted in SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY

AND ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886-1986 app. 1 (Center for Commercial Studies, Queen Mary
College 1987) The Berne Convention seeks to protect literary and artistic works by
requiring member states to enact domestic laws that recognize the moral rights of authors.
22Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade
in Counterfeit Goods, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex IC, Legal Instrument - Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 81
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement. TRIPS establishes minimum standards of intellectual
property protection and required enforcement procedures that countries must meet.
23 Ginsburg, supra note 20, at 266.
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Copyright Treaty ("WCT") 24 is the newest of these multilateral agreements.
The WCT, enacted in 1996, was the international community's answer to
copyright protection in the digital age. The most important aspect of the
WCT is its requirement that all contracting parties must create their own
national laws to protect the technological measures that prevent copyright
infringement.2 5 The United States was the first to comply with the WCT's
requirement by enacting the Digital Millennium Copyright Act in 1998.26
The United States went beyond WCT domestic legislation
implementation requirements.27 The DMCA not only outlaws the direct
circumvention of a technological measure that effectively controls access to
a copyrighted work,28 but it also outlaws the manufacture of any device that
is primarily designed for circumvention. 29 The latter refers to direct
circumvention of anything that protects a work from copyright
infringement.
One can relate this to the action of a "black box"
unscrambling cable channels. Cable companies scramble cable channel
signals that customers have not paid for. These companies give customers
who have paid for the extra channels a black box that unscrambles the
signal in their home. However, a customer who has not paid for the extra
channels can purchase an illegal black box and receive the channels free. If
24

World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty ("WCT"), done Dec. 20,

1996, S. TREATY Doc. No 105-17 (1997) [hereinafter WIPO Copyright Treaty].
25
1dat art. 11. Art. 11 provides:
Contracting parties shall provide adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies
against the circumvention of effective technological measures that are used by authors in a
connection with the exercise of their rights under this Treaty or the Berne Convention and
that restrict acts, in respect of their works, which are not authorized by the authors concerned
or permitted by law.
Id.
26

DMCA, supra note 7.

27

See Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the DigitalEconomy: Why the Anti-

Circumvention Regulations Need to be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. Li. 519-20 (1999).
28 17 U.S.C.S. at § 1201(a)(1)(A) (Law. Co-op. 1994 & Supp. 2002) ("No person shall
circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected
under this title.").
29 Id. § 1201(a)(2). § 1201 (a)(2) provides:
No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise traffic in any
technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof, that - is primarily designed and produced for the purpose of circumventing a technological
measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title;
has only limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to circumvent a
technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title; or
is marketed by that person or another acting in concert with that person with that person's
knowledge for use in circumventing a technological measure that effectively controls access
to a work protected under this title.

CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. 35:89

the DMCA were applied to this fact pattern, the DMCA would criminalize
the direct circumvention, the purchase and use of the "black box,"
undertaken by the cable customer.
The DMCA, in addition, makes illegal the manufacture of any device
akin to these "black
boxes," as long as its primary purpose is to circumvent
the protection. 30 Here, the DMCA is criminalizing the manufacturer of the
"black box." This type of contributory infringement is where the DMCA
breaks from the mold of traditional copyright law. Traditionally, copyright
laws protected intellectual property rights by controlling the act of copying
Outlawing the
and ignored the devices used to create the copy.
manufacture and distribution of circumvention technology shifts the focus
of copyright enforcement from the act of copying to controlling the
technology used to make copies. 31 This is akin to holding the manufacturer
of videocassette recorders ("VCRs") liable for copyright infringement.
Now, courts have long held manufacturers of VCRs are not liable for their
consumers' acts, 32 but Congress, foreseeing the dangers of internet piracy,
took the opportunity to shift the focus of enforcement to manufacturers of
"black boxes" with the DMCA.
Scholars describe the DMCA's shift in focus as both revolutionary and
risky.33 It is unclear whether the WCT required the outlawing of the
dissemination of circumvention technology,34 but Congress felt the
provision was necessary to protect copyrights on the Internet. 35 The
decision brought controversy and criticism from the intellectual property
community. Scholars have criticized the DMCA as being too broad and
having the potential to outlaw socially beneficial activities not enumerated
by the statute.36 Undoubtedly, the DMCA deserves these criticisms since it
is essentially outlawing the Internet's equivalent of the photocopier and the
30 See Samuelson, supra note 27, at 537.
31 JAY DRATLER, JR., CYBERLAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM,

1-27 (2000).
32See generally Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)
(holding that manufacturers of VCR's are not liable for contributory copyright
infringement).
33 See Dratler, supra note 31, at 1-8 to 1-9 (describing the DMCA as revolutionary
because it shifted the focus of copyright law from copiers to "the dissemination and
protection of copy-control technology.").
34 See Ginsburg, supra note 20 ("[I]t is not completely clear whether this text requires
prohibition not only of direct acts of circumvention, but also of the manufacture and
dissemination of circumvention devices. The U.S. and E.U. have interpreted art. 11 in the
latter sense.") (citations omitted).
35 See Dratler, supra note 31, at 1-27 to 1-28.
36 See Samuelson, supra note 27, at 519; Jason M. Schultz, Comment, Taking a Bite out of
Circumvention: Analyzing 17 U.S.C. § 1201 as a Criminal Law, 6 MICH. TELECOMM. &
TECH. L. REv. 1, 33 (2000).
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videocassette recorder. These two devices endured the same criticism as
the Advanced e-Book Processor because of the devices ability to make
copying easier. Eventually, the photocopier and VCR were accepted as
defensible under fair use,37 but some have argued that circumvention
programs such as the Advanced e-Book Processor are not defensible under
fair use. Allan Adler testified before Congress, stating:
the fair use doctrine has never given anyone the right to break other
laws for the stated purpose of exercising the fair use privilege. Fair use
does not allow you to break into a locked library in order to make 'fair use'
copies of the books in it, or steal newspapers from a vending machine in
order to copy articles and share them with a friend.38
Section 1201 is aimed at this type of infringement, which allows users
of a circumvention technology to gain access to a work; it is not aimed at
preventing the owner of a lawfully obtained copy to make fair use of that
copy.3 9 The aim of the Advanced e-Book Processoris not gaining access to
a work; its sole purpose is to make non-infringing uses of lawfully obtained
e-Books, so Elcomsoft has a fair use defense before we even delve into
extraterritoriality.
IM. The U.S. Looks Disfavorably Upon the ExtraterritorialApplication Of
Its Laws
The extraterritorial application of laws occurs when one sovereign
state extends its laws beyond the physical limits of its borders to hold
individuals in another sovereign state responsible for actions in violation of
the first sovereign state's law.4 ° A law is characterized as being
extraterritorial when the conduct of the activity being regulated, the effects
of the activity, or both occur outside the regulating state.
There has been a longstanding presumption against extraterritoriality
in the United States ever since Justice Holmes' 1909 opinion in American
42
Banana
Co.law
v. United
Fruit Company.
Holmes
reasonedwith
thatthe
to
apply U.S.
extraterritorially
would be Justice
an unjust
"interference
37See Copyright Act of 1976, 17

U.S.C. § 107 (1994 & Supp. 2002); See Sony, 464 U.S.

at 417; See American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994).
38 WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act; and Online Copyright Liability
Limitation Act: Hearing on H.R. 2281 and H.R. 2280 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and
Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 204, 208 (1997)
(prepared statement of Allan Adler).
39See Samuelson, supra note 27, at 539.
') See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 588 (6th ed. 1990).
41 William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality,16
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 85, 87-88 (1998).
42
Id.at 85; See also American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
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authority of another sovereign, '' 3 and noted, "the very meaning of
sovereignty is that the decree of the sovereign makes law." 44 Therefore,
Holmes reasoned, "the general and almost universal rule is that the
character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the
law of the country where the act is done., 45 This passage suggests that a
U.S. law cannot reach conduct outside the United States unless there is
Congressional intent to do so, even if the foreign conduct caused domestic
effects.4 6 Justice Holmes applied the presumption to limit the expansion of
the Sherman Act in antitrust cases. American Banana is no longer the law
in antitrust because the Sherman Act has subsequently been found to apply
extraterritorially, 47 but the presumption against extraterritoriality did not
suffer the same fate as American Banana, although the presumption was
virtually forgotten for years.4 8
The presumption against extraterritoriality reappeared in 1991 when
the Supreme Court applied the presumption to Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 in EEOC v. Arabian Oil Company, ("Aramco"). 49 The Aramco
case involved a naturalized United States citizen born in Lebanon and
working in Saudi Arabia for a United States corporation. Aramco fired the
petitioner, prompting him to file a Title VII claim against the corporation
for discrimination based on his race, religion, and national origin. 50 The
Court held that the petitioner could not prevail because there was no clearly
expressed affirmative congressional intent that Title VII applies abroad. I
The Court stated that "[i]t is a longstanding principle of American law 'that
legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is 52meant to apply
only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.'
William Dodge, Professor at Hastings College of Law, notes that the
remarkable thing about the Supreme Court's decision in Aramco was not
just that they applied the presumption but how strongly they applied it,
43American Banana, 213 U.S. at 356.
44Id. at 358.
45
1Id.at 356.
46

Dodge, supra note 41, at 105.

47See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764,796 (1993); See United States v.

Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416,433 (2d Cir. 1945) [hereinafter Alcoa]. In Alcoa and
Hartford Fire, the major cases following American Banana, the courts held that U.S.
antitrust law applied extraterritorially where the foreign conduct "[was] intended to affect
[United States] imports and did affect them." Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 444.
48 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 415, reporters' note 2 (1987)
(suggesting that the presumption no longer exists).
49499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) [hereinafterAramco].
51Id.at

244.

51Id.
52 Idat 248. (quoting Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)).
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because there was good evidence that Congress had intended Title VII to
apply extraterritorially.5 3 Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion
suggested that only a clear statement in the statute itself would be sufficient
to overcome the presumption.54 The Court also established guidelines as to
the kind of statutory language that would grant a law extraterritorial reach.
The focus was on the commerce language of Title VII. Chief Justice
Rehnquist stated that limited, boilerplate "commerce" language, such as the
language seen in Title VII, does not support the contention that Congress
intended a statute to apply abroad.5 5 He noted, however, that statutory
language expressly stating that the legislature could apply the law to the
"extent of Conress' power over commerce" signals it may apply
extraterritorially.
Thus, the Court held that boilerplate commerce
language is not sufficient to grant extraterritorial reach, but a broad
jurisdictional grant of all congressional commerce powers would be
sufficient.
Justice Marshall's dissent criticized Chief Justice Rehnquist for
recasting the presumption as a clear statement rule.57 Marshall felt that the
Court should only rely on the presumption against extraterritoriality after an
exhaustive analysis of the statute's legislative history. 58 Marshall believed
that, if the Court undertook this analysis, then Title VII would apply outside
the U.S. 59 Congress apparently agreed with Marshall's reading of Title VII,
as they were quick to amend Title VII to apply extraterritorially.6 °
53 Dodge, supra note 41, at 86.
54 Id.; See Aramco, 499 U.S. at 258.
55
Aramco, 499 U.S. at 252-53. The Court opined:
The Lanham Act by its terms applies to "all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by
Congress." The Constitution gives Congress the power "[t]o regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. Const., Art.
I, § 8, cl. 3. Since the Act expressly stated that it applied to the extent of Congress' power
over commerce, the Court in Steele concluded that Congress intended that the statute apply
abroad. By contrast, Title VII's more limited, boilerplate "commerce" language does not
support such an expansive construction of congressional intent. Moreover, unlike the
language in the Lanham Act, Title VII's definition of "commerce" was derived expressly
from the LMRDA, a statute that this Court had held, prior to the enactment of Title VII, did
not apply abroad (citing McCulloch v. Sociedad National de Marineros de Honduras, 377
U.S. 10,15).
Id.
56

See id.

57

See id at 261.
Id. (finding that "a court may properly rely on this presumption only after exhausting all
of the traditional tools 'whereby unexpressed congressional intent may be ascertained.")
(quoting Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 285).
58

59 Id.
60 See

Dodge, supra note 41, at 87.
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The Supreme Court has continued to apply the presumption against
extraterritoriality to other areas of the law in post-Aramco decisions. 6 ,
These decisions seem to abandon Chief Justice Rehnquist's clear statement
rule for the broader statutory interpretation that Justice Marshall suggested.
Rehnquist himself abandoned the clear statement rule when he wrote the
majority opinion in Smith v. United States.62 His opinion looked at both the
statutory language of the Federal Tort Claims Act and its legislative history3
to determine if the Court could apply the statute to conduct in Antarctica.
William Dodge correctly asserts "that the Supreme Court does not view the
presumption as a clear statement rule. 64 The Court will examine 'all
available evidence'
65 of congressional intent in determining whether a statute
applies abroad.,
While Congressional intent is the most important factor in overcoming
the presumption against extraterritoriality, it is not the only factor used by
the Supreme Court. The Court also considers where the alleged illegal
conduct occurred and if persons in that country felt the effects. Under
Justice Holmes' traditional view, as stated in American Banana, U.S. law
only applies to conduct that takes place inside the United States, despite the
fact that conduct abroad may have effects in the United States.66 William
Dodge, however, argues that Justice Holmes' view of the presumption is
not the current view of the U.S. Supreme Court.6 7 He argues that the Court

is more concerned with whether or not the conduct causes effects in the
United States. 68
Dodge suggests "that the presumption against
extraterritoriality does not turn on where the69conduct at issue occurred but
on where the effects of that conduct are felt.,
In support of his view, Dodge cites to Chief Justice Rehnquist's
Aramco opinion. Chief Justice Rehnquist distinguished the Aramco
decision from the Supreme Court's previous decision in Steele v. Bulova

61

Id. Those other areas of the law include the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, the

Federal Tort Claims Act, and the Immigration and Nationality Act. Id. (citing Argentine
Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 440-41(1989) (Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act); Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 203-04 (1993) (Federal Tort Claims
Act); Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 173-74 (1993) (Immigration and
Nationality Act)).
62 See 507 U.S. 197 (1993).
63 Id. at 201-02, 202 n.4.
64 Dodge, supra note 41, at 97 (citing Sale, 509 U.S. at 177).
65 id.
661d. at 105.
67

1d. at 100.

68 id.
69

Id. at 94.
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Watch Co.,7° which held the Lanham Act to apply extraterritorially and did
not apply the presumption. 1 The Steele case involved illegal conduct
whose effects were felt within the United States, though the conduct
occurred beyond the territorial boundaries of the country. Chief Justice
Rehnquist distinguished Aramco in two distinct ways. First, he explained
that the commerce language of the Lanham Act was much broader than that
of Title VII. 72 Second, and most important, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted
that in Steele, "the allegedly unlawful conduct had some effects within the
United States," while in Aramco, the effect of the petitioner's firing could
only be felt in Lebanon.73
The Supreme Court also refused to apply the presumption against
extraterritoriality to the Sherman Act in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v.
California.74 Like Steele, Hartford involved foreign conduct that had
effects inside the United States. The Court held that the "Sherman Act
applies to foreign conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact
produce some substantial effect in the United States. 75 The decision
reinforced Judge Learned Hand's decision in United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America ("Alcoa"), which previously established the extraterritorial
reach of the Sherman Act.76 Judge Hand stated, "we should not impute to
Congress an intent to punish all whom its courts can catch, for conduct that
has no consequences in the United States, 77 but recognized that states
generally could act if there were consequences within their borders. 78 The
Supreme Court in Hartfbrd refined this test by requiring that there be an
express purpose to create a substantial effect in the United States and that
an actual substantial effect had occurred in the United States.79
Dodge notes that the Supreme Court was unwilling to apply the
presumption against extraterritoriality to the Lanham Act in Steele and the
Sherman Act in Hartford because both cases involved extraterritorial
conduct that had caused effects in the United States.80 On the other hand,
Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., Inc., 344 U.S. 280 (1952) (holding that the Lanham Act
applies extraterritorially, without applying the presumption).
71Aramco, 499 U.S. at 252.
72
See id at 252-53.
73 Id. "Effects on a U.S. citizen abroad are generally not considered to constitute effects
within the United States." Dodge, supra note 41, at 94 n.78 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
70

FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402, cmt. g (1987)).
74 See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993).
75
1 d. at 796.
76 See
77

148 F.2d 416, 433 (2d Cir. 1945).

Id. at 443.

78 id.
79

Hartford, 509 U.S. at 796.

80 Dodge, supra note 41, at 100.
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he suggests that the Supreme Court applied the presumption to Title VII in
Aramco, the Federal Tort Claims Act in Smith, and to the Immigration and
Nationality Act in Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. because the foreign
conduct did not produce harmful effects inside the United States. 8' Thus,
one can argue that the Supreme Court is focusing on the effects of the
conduct and is disregarding the traditional emphasis on where the conduct
occurred. However, this argument ignores the fact that precedent in
antitrust law barred the Court from considering the presumption in
Hartford,82 but Aramco's discussion of Steele gives great weight to
Dodge's. 83 Aramco tells us that the presumption against extraterritoriality
can be overcome if two things occur. First, the activity made illegal by the
U.S. law must have some effect inside the United States. Second, Congress
must have intended the law to apply to conduct within foreign nations. In
searching for this Congressional intent, U.S. courts should look to "all
available evidence" including the legislative history of the statutory law.84
IV.

The Presumption Against ExtraterritorialityIs a Cornerstone Of U.S.
Copyright Law

The general rule in copyright law is that copyright laws do not apply
extraterritorially. 85 However, there have been certain refinements to the
81 id.

82 See Hartford, 509 U.S. at 814 (Scalia,

J., dissenting) ("The Sherman Act contains

similar 'boilerplate language,' [as that used in Title VII] and if the question [in this case]
were not governed by precedent, it would be worth considering whether that presumption
controls the outcome here. We have, however, found the presumption to be overcome with
respect to our antitrust laws; it is now well established that the Sherman Act applies
extraterritorially.")(citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
582, n.6 (1986); Cont'l Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 704
(1962); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945)).
83 The Court explained:
While recognizing that "the legislation of Congress will not extend beyond the boundaries of
the United States unless a contrary legislative intent appears, "the Court concluded that in
light of the fact that the allegedly unlawful conduct had some effects within the United
States, coupled with the Act's "broad jurisdictional grant" and its "sweeping reach into 'all
commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress,' " the statute was properly
interpreted as applying abroad.
Aramco, 499 U.S. at 252 (quoting Steele v Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 285, 287
(1952)).
84 See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 176, 177 (1993).
85 See Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1095-96 (9th
Cir. 1994)("The 'undisputed axiom,'... that the United States copyright laws have no
application to extraterritorial infringement predates the 1909 Act . . . and, as discussed
above, the principle of territoriality consistently has been reaffirmed.")(citing 3 David
Nimmer & Melville B. Nimmer, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.04 (A)(3)(b), at 12-86 (1991)).
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general rule. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures86 enumerated one
refinement, or quasi-exemption.8 7 The Sheldon court held that "where there
was an act of infringement in the United States any profits from that
infringement abroad were subject to an equitable interest, which had a situs
in the U.S., and thus could be subject to seizure. 88 Further exceptions
include collateral estoppel, contributory infringement, the importation of
"gray goods," and "transitory" tort cases.89 There used to be another
common quasi-exception created by the oft-criticized Peter Starr Prod. v.
Twin Cont I Films, Inc. ("Starr"). 90 The Starr court allowed the Copyright
Act9 1 to be extended extraterritorially when an authorization to copy, not
granted by the copyright holder, took place inside the United States even
though the infringement took place abroad. 92 This is an important decision
because it was the first case to apply copyright law to conduct that occurred
outside the United States. However, this exception disappeared in 1994
when Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co. 93 overruled the
Starr decision.94
The Ninth Circuit's Subafilms decision reaffirmed the axiom that U.S.
copyright laws have no application to foreign conduct, and applied the
presumption of extraterritoriality to the copyright issues before the court.95
The issue in the case was whether an authorization from inside the United
States to reproduce the Beatle's animated feature film "Yellow Submarine"
See also Michael

1. Davis,

Extra-territorial Jurisdictionin Copyright Cases, 416 PLI/Pat

349, 351 (1995) ("The Copyright Act has been consistently interpreted to apply domestically
only and has been held not to have extra-territorial operation."); Marc E. Mayer, Do
InternationalInternet Sound Recording Infringements Implicate U.S. Copyright Law?, 15

No. 5 Computer Law. 11, 11 (1998) ("United States courts have ... consistently refused to
extend U.S. copyright law to acts occurring outside the physical territory of the United States
- regardless of whether those acts would have been infringing had they taken place within
United States territory[.]").
86 106 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1939), affd 309 U.S. 390 (1940).See Davis, supra note 85, at 351
(These quasi exceptions are "considered refinements of the general rule and not inconsistent
with it.").
87 See Davis, supra note 85, at 351 (These quasi exceptions are "considered refinements
of the general rule and not inconsistent with it.").
88 Davis, supra note 85, at 352.
" See id.
at 352-355.
90783 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1986).
9'17 U.S.C.S §§ 101-1332 (Law. Co-op. 1994 & Supp. 2002).
92 See

Davis, supra note 85, at 352.

9'24 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 1994) (sitting en banc).
94
1d. at 1099.
95
See id.at 1095-96. ("The undisputed axiom ... that the United States' copyright laws
have no application to extraterritorial infringement predates the 1909 Act, and .. .the
principle of territoriality consistently has been reaffirmed.")(citations omitted).
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outside the United States violated U.S. copyright laws. The court held that
the reproduction did not violate U.S. copyright laws, and the appellees
could not overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality because the
acts of infringement took place entirely abroad. 96 It further reasoned that
the presumption applied despite the appellee's contention "that failure to
apply the copyright laws extraterritorially in this case will have a disastrous
effect on the American film industry."9 7 The court explained that the
touchstone of extraterritorial analysis is an "ascertainment of congressional
intent," 98 and, in this case, "there is no clear expression of congressional
intent in either the 1976 [Copyright] Act or other relevant enactments to
alter the pre-existing extraterritoriality doctrine." 99 Thus, the court
concluded that the appellees' "parade of horribles" was not enough to
"overturn over eighty years of consistent jurisprudence on the
extraterritorial reach of the copyright laws without further guidance from
Congress."'10 Unlike Aramco, Congress apparently agreed with the court's
interpretation of extraterritoriality in copyright law and did not revise the
then-existing copyright legislation.
The Subafilms court further justified its application of the presumption
by noting the importance of the national treatment of copyright laws and the
potential for the extraterritorial application of U.S. copyright laws to result
in international discord.101 The court was worried that the "[e]xtraterritorial
application of American law . . . might offend other member nations by
effectively displacing their law in circumstances in which previously it was
assumed to govern. Consequently, an extension of extraterritoriality might
undermine Congress's objective of
,4102 achieving 'effective and harmonious'
copyright laws among all nations.
The court opined that it did not want
to send a signal to03foreign nations that the United States thought their laws
were inadequate. 1
The Subafilms decision cuts against William Dodge's notion that the
presumption against extraterritoriality turns on the effects of the conduct.
The Ninth Circuit adopted Justice Holmes' traditional view of the
presumption and suggested that a U.S. law cannot reach wholly foreign
conduct, regardless of any effects the conduct may have caused in the
96

Id. at 1098.

97

1d. at 1095.
1d. at 1096.

98

99 Id.

'°°id. at 1095.
'0' See id. at 1097 ("application of the presumption is particularly appropriate when '[i]t
serves to protect against unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations
which could result in international discord[.]"')(quoting Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248).
02
1 Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 609, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 43).
103Id. at

1097-98.
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United States. The court, however, did use limiting language, holding that
only infringing acts that had occurred entirely overseas would escape
United States copyright laws.' °4 The court favorably cited and applied
Justice Hand's decision in Alcoa, where he determined that the Sherman
Act could not extend extraterritorially if the infringement took place wholly
overseas. 0 5 This seems to open the door for the Copyright Act to
apprehend copyright infringers whose actions do not take place entirely
abroad. Therefore, it is now necessary to discuss whether the United States,
in the present case against Elcomsoft, is applying its copyright laws, via the
DMCA, to territorial conduct, (conduct occurring within the United States),
or to extraterritorial conduct, (conduct that takes place entirely abroad).
V. The Presumption Against ExtraterritorialityMay Not Be a Defense
Available To Elcomsoft Because Of Elcomsof!'s Internet Contacts
A typical law or regulation forbids a certain activity within a territorial
jurisdiction. A regulation applies extraterritorially when the conduct of the
forbidden activity, the effects of the forbidden activity, or both occur
outside the regulating state. 10 6 Activity conducted with its effects
07
exclusively in the regulating state is territorial, not extraterritorial.'
Therefore, if a court applies the DMCA extraterritorially in the Elcomsoft
case, either the conduct and/or effects of the conduct must have been
present outside the United States.
The DMCA may or may not apply extraterritorially in the present case
against Elcomsoft when looking at the conduct and effects of the activity.
The activities that the DMCA forbids are the manufacture, importation,
offering to the public, providing, or otherwise trafficking in the Advanced
0 8
eBook Processor.1
Looking at each of the activities the DMCA forbids,
the manufacturing of the Advanced e-Book Processor is the only activity
that can be said to take place in an actual territory.109 The manufacture of
the software took place in Russia, which is why the government is not
prosecuting Elcomsoft for manufacturing the processor. Elcomsoft is
strictly being charged with the importation; offering to the public;

4Id. at 1099.
15

Id. at 1098.

106

Dodge, supra note 41, at 87-88.

"' Id. at 87.
108 1 will assume that the Advanced eBook Processor is a device primarily designed and
produced for the purpose of circumventing a technological measure that effectively controls
access to a work protected under the DMCA.
109That territory would be Russia.

CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. 35:89

providing; and trafficking of the software program." 0 These activities were
all conducted on the Internet, via Elcomsoft's website, and cannot
definitively be identified as having occurred in one territory or across the
borders of any one territory rather than in or across another territory.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires
minimum contacts for a state to assert personal jurisdiction over a foreign
defendant. ll Personal jurisdiction can be either general or specific.
General personal jurisdiction exists when the defendant's contacts with the
forum are continuous and systematic. 112 Specific personal jurisdiction is
claim specific, depending upon whether the foreign defendant has
purposefully availed himself to the benefits of the forum so that it is
reasonable for the defendant to expect to be amendable to a suit arising out
of those specific contacts." l3 Courts lump general and specific personal
jurisdiction together and referred to as personal jurisdiction for the purpose
of this analysis.
The Internet tends to muddy the water during the search for personal
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has not yet discussed obtaining personal
jurisdiction through the Internet, but hosts of lower courts have begun to
flesh out a few tests. 14 Most courts in Internet jurisdictions cases use the
"sliding scale test" as foundation for their decisions." 15 Many courts, most
notably those in the Ninth Circuit,' 16 have adopted the sliding scale test first
promulgated by the Pennsylvania District Court in Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo
Dot Corn, Incorporated." The sliding scale test places Internet activities
into three distinct categories along a spectrum. "At one end of the spectrum
are situations where a defendant clearly does business over the Internet. If
110 See Criminal Complaint, U.S. v. Sklyarov (N.D. Cal. sworn July 7, 2001), at
http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCAIUS-vElcomsoft/20010707_complaint.html.
Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
" 2 Seeid at 318.
113
See id. at 319. Brian E. Daughdrill, Poking Along in the FastLane on the Information
Super Highway: Territorial-BasedJurisprudence in a Technological World, 52 MERCER L.
REV. 1217, 1222 (2001).
"14 Asaad Siddiqi, Welcome to the City of Bytes? An Assessment of the Traditional
Methods Employed in the InternationalApplication ofJurisdictionover Internet Activities - Including a Critique of Suggested Approaches, 14 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 43, 68 (2001).
1t5
Daughdrill, supra note 113, at 1222-23.
116See

Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1320 (9th Cir. 1998); Cybersell,

Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 418 (9th Cir. 1997); Millennium Enters., Inc. v.
Millennium Music, LP, 33 F. Supp. 2d 907, 915-16 (D. Or. 1999).
117 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D.Pa.1997). The Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Circuit Court's of
Appeals have also recognized the sliding scale test. See Christian Sci. Bd. of Dirs. v. Nolan,
259 F.3d 209, 218 (4th Cir. 2001). See also, Mink v. AAAA Dev. LLC, 190 F.3d 333, 33637 (5th Cir. 1999); and Soma Med. Int'l v. Standard Chartered Bank, 196 F.3d 1292, 1296
(10th Cir. 1999).
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the defendant enters into contracts with residents of a foreign jurisdiction
that involve the knowing and repeated transmission of computer files over
the Internet, personal jurisdiction is proper." 18 "At the opposite end are
situations where a defendant has simply posted information on an Internet
Web site[,] which is accessible to users in foreign jurisdictions. A passive
Web site that does little more than make information available to those who
are interested in it is not grounds for the exercise of personal
jurisdiction."" 9 The middle ground is occupied by interactive Web sites
where a user can exchange information with the host computer. In these
cases, the exercise of jurisdiction is determined by examining the level of
interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of information that
occurs on the Web site."' 12 The sliding scale test determines personal
jurisdiction by placing the focus on the level of interactivity and
commercial nature of the website. 121
Some Internet jurisdiction cases make use of the "effects test" to
determine whether a defendant has purposefully availed him or herself to
the forum's jurisdiction. The "effects test" first appeared in the 1984
Supreme Court case Calder v. Jones122 and has been adapted in many
Internet jurisdiction cases, including those involving intellectual property
disputes.' 23 Courts use the test to "overcome Internet activity that,
otherwise insufficient to sustain the assertion of personal jurisdiction on the
sliding scale, purposefully availed itself [to] the forum by deliberately
aiming the intentional misconduct at a forum plaintiff."' 124 The Supreme
Court in Calder found personal jurisdiction over a Florida defendant who
directed his tortious conduct at a California plaintiff, because the defendant

118 Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124 (citations omitted).
119Id.

120 id.
121 See

Cybersell, 130 F. 3d at 419 ("In sum, the common thread, well stated by the

district court in Zippo, is that 'the likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally
exercised is directly proportionate to the nature and quality of commercial activity that an
entity conducts over the Internet. "')(quoting Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124); Berthold Types
Ltd. v. European Mikograf Corp., 102 F. Supp. 2d 928, 932 (N.D. Ill. 2000)("Ultimately,
whether a state may exercise personal jurisdiction is determined by 'examining the level of
interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of information that occurs on the Web
site."') (quoting Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124).
122465 U.S. 783, 783 (1984).
123 Siddiqi,

supra note 114, at 67-68; See Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F. 3d

1316, 1321 (9th Cir. 1998); Roberts-Gordon, LLC v. Superior Radiant Products, Ltd., 85 F.
Supp. 2d 202 (W.D.N.Y. 2000); Bailey v. Turbine Design, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 790 (E.D.
Tenn. 2000); Nutrition Physiology Corp. v. Enviros Ltd., 87 F. Supp. 2d 648 (N.D. Tex.
2000).
124Daughdrill, supra note 113, at 1227.
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intentionally aimed his conduct directly at the plaintiff's forum. 125 The
Court explained that because the defendant's conduct was intentional, the
defendant should have reasonably foreseen facing litigation in
26 the court of
the jurisdiction where Plaintiff felt the effects of his conduct. 1
The Ninth Circuit has applied the "effects test" to cases that do not
involve an intentional tort if the defendant's action is "more akin to a tort
claim than a contract claim."' 127 The court in Panavision Internationalv.
Toeppen applied the "effects test" to a trademark claim where the defendant
"purposefully registered Panavision's trademarks as his domain names on
the Internet to force Panavision to pay him money."'' 28 The "effects test"
however will not apply to the case against Elcomsoft because it is not a tort
action nor akin to one. The present case against Elcomsoft is not governed
by the "effects test" because it is a criminal action brought by the United
States government. Therefore, the personal jurisdiction analysis will hinge
on the sliding scale test, with the29focus on whether Elcomsoft has "clearly
done business over the Internet.'
Court's have differed on exactly what "doing business over the
Internet" entails under the sliding scale test, but a recent district court case
coming out of the Seventh Circuit, Berthold Types Ltd. v. European
Mikograf Corp.,130 has established a fairly high bar. The Berthold case
involved a plaintiff who marketed typefaces with distinctive registered
trademarks and a defendant, Helios Software, a German corporation, that
marketed font software package PDF Handshake in competition with
plaintiff's typefaces.' 3 '
Helios ran an interactive English website,
http://www.helios.com, as part of its business. Customers who wanted to
purchase PDF Handshake first had to download and print a service
agreement from the website.13 2 Next, customers had to submit the
33
completed agreement and make payment to a national Helios distributor.
Once these steps were verified by Helios, the customer was then allowed to

125 465

U.S. at 789.

Id. at 790.
127 Ziegler v. Indian River County, 64 F.3d 470, 474 (9th Cir. 1995); See also Panavision,
126

141 F.3d at 1321 (favorably citing the district court's determination that the Calder analysis
was proper because the case was akin to a tort case).
128 141 F.3d at 1321.
29

' Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124.
130 102 F. Supp. 2d 928 (N.D. 111.
2000).
131
Id.at
131

929.
Id.at 930.

133Id.at 930.

The U.S. distributor for Helios is European Mikograf Corp., located in
California. Id.at 929.
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download files containing updates to PDF Handshake and other Helios
products directly from the website.' 3 4
The Berthold court determined that Helios was not clearly doing
business over the Internet because no orders were taken and no contracts
were entered into over the website.135 Further, having customers fill out a
service agreement and mail it, along with a payment, to a national dealer
did not rise to the level of business activity sufficient to confer jurisdiction
under the first part of the sliding scale test. 136 The court stated that the
Helios website landed in the middle ground of the third part of the test and,
therefore, turned on the level of interactivity and the commercial nature of
the exchange of information. 137 The court determined that the website did
not establish personal jurisdiction because, "while the Helios site does
provide information on ordering products, Helios makes no commercial
response to customers' submissions" and3 8 "nothing on the website is
specifically targeted at Illinois consumers."'
The court also acknowledged that some jurisdictions have included
non-web based contacts, alongside web-based contacts, in analyzing
39
personal jurisdiction under the middle category of the sliding scale test.
The court looked at these additional contacts and found that "the only
contacts alleged by [the] plaintiff unrelated to the website are a trip to a
trade show in Chicago by representatives of Helios ... and an upcoming
educational seminar in Chicago to be sponsored by Helios."'' 40 The court
stated that these additional facts, taken alone or considered
with the
41
website, were still insufficient to find personal jurisdiction.
The Berthold case closely parallels Elcomsoft's.
The Russian
company
maintains
an
interactive
English
website
at

134 Id. at

930.

"' Id. at 933.
36

1

id.

137 id.
138

id.

139 Id. (citing Digital Equip. Corp. v. Altavista Tech. Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 462 (D.
Mass. 1997)); see also Millennium Enters., Inc. v. Millennium Music, LP, 33 F. Supp. 2d
907, 916-17 (D. Or. 1999)("Courts have reached differing conclusions with respect to those
cases falling into the middle "interactive" category identified in Zippo.... In these cases
some courts find that an interactive Web site alone is sufficient to establish minimum
contacts. Others find minimum contacts through additional non-Internet activity in the
forum, regardless of whether the activity is related to the underlying claim. Finally, some
courts require additional conduct in the forum that is related to the plaintiffs cause of
action.").
140Id. at 934.
141Id.
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http://www.elcomsoft.com,1 42 and a customer wishing to purchase the
Advanced e-Book Processor must also go through an American company.
According to the DOJ complaint, customers purchase the software through
"Register Now!", a company based in Issaquah, Washington.143 "Register
Now!" collects the $99 fee for the software via its website,
http://www.regnow.com, and sends a verification of payment to
Elcomsoft.144 Elcomsoft then sends a registration code to the customer who
can then use the code to download the Advanced e-Book Processor from
Elcomsoft's website.1 45 Finally, Elcomsoft also has had non-web based
contact with the United States via Dmitry's presence at the computer
conference in Las Vegas.
The similarity between Berthold and the Elcomsoft case leads one to
believe that Elcomsoft's website will fall into the middle category on the
sliding scale test. However, Elcomsoft's website could be found to be
commercial and have a greater level of interactivity than the website in
Berthold because "Register Now!" is not a distributor of Elcomsoft's
products. In Berthold, European Mikograf Corp. acted as a go-between for
the sale of Helios products in the United States. European Mikograf, being
a distributor, received money from customers and then sent the product to
the customers, thus beginning and finishing the commercial transaction.
"Register Now!" is only a payment processor and does not actually receive
and then distribute Elcomsoft's products. Elcomsoft actually completes the
transaction by directly sending customers the registration code needed to
download the software. Thus, "Register Now!" does not provide the allimportant buffer between the forum and the foreign company, and
Elcomsoft's completing the transaction by directly e-mailing the
registration code can be seen as a commercial response to customers,
moving it from the middle category to the "clearly doing business over the
Internet" category.
VI. Congress DidNot Intend For the DMCA To Apply Extraterritorially
Congressional intent, as previously stated in Section III, is the single
most important factor in determining whether courts should apply a U.S.
law extraterritorially.
Assuming, arguendo, that the prosecution of
142 The

website is hosted in Chicago, Illinois. Press Release, Dept. Of Justice, Indictment

under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (Aug. 28, 2001) [hereinafter DOJ Press
Release], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/can/press/html2001_08-28_skyarov.htmi
(last visited Oct. 17, 2002).
143 Id.; See O'Connell Aff., supra note 19,
8b. For example, Elcomsoft received
verification from "Register Now!" for its unlocking key registration code.
144 See DOJ Press Release, supra note 143; O'Connell Affidavit, supra note 9, 8b.
145 DOJ Press Release, supra note 142; See O'Connell Affidavit, supra note 9,
8b.
Elcomsoft sent an unlocking key registration code to a purchaser in San Jose, California.
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Elcomsoft under the DMCA is extraterritorial, the success of the
prosecution depends on whether Congress intended the DMCA to apply
outside the territorial United States.
The court in Subafilms decision stated that the Copyright Act does not
apply extraterritorially and, thus, the presumption against extraterritorial
application applies.' 4 The court also held that the presumption would
apply to subsequent amendments to the Copyright Act unless those
amendments expressed a clear intent to apply abroad. 47 The DMCA is a
subsequent amendment to the Copyright Act. The DMCA amended a host
of existing sections and created several new chapters and sections in the
1976 Act. 14 8 The specific provisions concerning the circumvention of copy
protection, Sections 1201-1205, were placed in the newly created Chapter
Therefore, the presumption against
12 of the Copyright Act.
extraterritoriality applies unless there is clear intent to the contrary.
The Subafilms court stressed the need for clear congressional intent, 149
but a clear intent does not mean there must be a clear statement from
Congress to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality. 50 Clear
intent can be shown, and the presumption overcome, in ways other than
direct statements in the body of a statute. The Supreme Court looks to all
"available evidence" to determine if there was congressional intent for a
statute to apply abroad.' 5' This broad search includes interpreting the
statutory language and the legislative history of a law.
If one analyzes the language of the DMCA, it becomes apparent that
the statute does not apply extraterritorially strictly looking at the language
of the added anti-circumvention provision of the Copyright Act. 52 The
DMCA's statutory language adds nothing to the Copyright Act to suggest
that the legislature intended it to eliminate the presumption when a person
provides to the public a technology primarily designed to circumvent a
copy-control technology. Further, the DMCA does not contain any
Therefore, the analysis undertaken by Justice
commerce language.
Rehnquist in Aramco regarding the breadth of the commerce language is
'46

24 F.3d at 1095-96.

147

See id. at 1095, 1096 ("More fundamentally, however, we are unwilling to overturn

over eighty years of consistent jurisprudence on the extraterritorial reach of the copyright
laws without further guidance from Congress.").
148 See The DMCA amended §§ 101, 104, 104A, 108, 109, 112, 117, 411(a)and added
chapters 12 (§§ 1201-1205) and 13 (§§ 1301-1332) along with § 512 to the Copyright Act.
See Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860
(1998).
149See 24 F.3d at 1096 ("There is no clear expression of congressional intent in either the
1976 Act or other relevant enactments to alter the preexisting extraterritoriality doctrine.").
150 See Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 201-03 (1993).
151See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 177 (1993).
52 See 17 U.S.C.S § 1201 (Law Co-Op 1994 & Supp. 2002).
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inapplicable here. 153 There is no language in the statute indicating
Congress' intent to reach beyond our borders through the DMCA, but the
lack of a clear statement by the legislature does not rule out the possibility
of the DMCA applying extraterritorially. Since the statutory language does
not give much guidance, we must look at the legislative history to
determine the issue of extraterritoriality.
The DMCA's legislative history does not offer evidence of a clear
intent by Congress to eliminate the presumption against extraterritorially.
There is no mention of or concern for this issue in Congress. The
legislature was more concerned with issues of fair use and possible
contributory infringement issues for Internet Service Providers. The only
international concern of the legislature was the need to protect American
copyright interests abroad. In the House, Congressman Berman voiced this
concern, "[m]ake no mistake, American intellectual property and the almost
unsurpassed contribution is makes to our balance of trade is at risk around
the world. Piracy costs American creators $15 billion in sales. In a digital
era which brings the capacity to make perfect copies of copyrighted works,
we must enact this legislation to fight overseas piracy and the toll it takes in
the export revenues and American jobs."' 154 In the Senate, Senator Leahy
agreed that" . . . the DMCA will also encourage the continued growth of
the Internet and the global information infrastructure. It will encourage the
ingenuity of the American people, and will send a powerful message to
intellectual property pirates that we will not tolerate theft.' ' 55 He went on
to explain that "this legislation is an important step for protecting American
ingenuity and creative expression.' 56 Congress' focus in enacting the
DMCA was to protect American copyright interests. The above quotes
from members of Congress recall the same 'parade of horribles' argument
asserted by the plaintiffs in Subafilms. The Subafilms plaintiffs claimed,
"failure to apply the copyright laws extraterritorially in this case will have a
disastrous effect on the American film industry.' 57 The court did not
accept the plaintiffs' contention then and Congress's seemingly parallel
'parade of horribles' argument would not give the argument increased
weight today.
It can be said that the DMCA is a blueprint for other countries in
adopting similar copyright laws in compliance with the WCT. It can be
argued however that Congress did not intend for the DMCA to conflict with
other nations copyright laws adopted in compliance with other nations
copyright laws. Senator Leahy stated "The bill provides the protection
153See Aramco, 499 U.S. at 252-53; see also Justice Rehnquist's discussion of commerce

language, at note 56 and accompanying text.
154144 CONG. REC. H7001, H7099 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1998) (statement of Rep. Berman).
155144 CONG. REC. S11887, S11890 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1998) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
156144 CONG. REC. Si 1887, S 11891 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1998) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
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necessary to encourage copyright owners to make their works available
a
over the Internet and in other digital formats. This legislation sets' 58
standard for other nations who must implement these treaties."'
Congressman Hatch stated, "[The] WIPO treaties and the DMCA will
protect the property rights of Americans in their work as they move in the
global, digital marketplace ....
,159 These statements by Senator Leahy, the
Senate's main proponent of the DMCA, and Congressman Hatch, the
House's main proponent of the DMCA, indicate that the DMCA does not
have extraterritorial reach. These two men refer to the classic definition of
copyright law as a bundle of national rights, and the importance of
countries creating their own laws, which could be patterned off the DMCA,
to protect intellectual property in the digital age. Thus, Congress still has a
nationalistic view of the DMCA and does not intend for it to reach beyond
our borders.
The Subafilms decision supports the interpretation of congressional
intent that copyright laws are nationalistic and should not conflict with
another country's laws. The court further justified its application of the
presumption by noting the importance of the national treatment of copyright
laws and the potential for the extraterritorial application of U.S. copyright
laws to result in international discord. 60 The court was worried that the
extraterritorial application of American law "might offend other member
nations by effectively displacing their law in circumstances in which
previously it was assumed to govern." ' 6 1 Moreover, the court held that "an
extension of extraterritoriality might undermine Congress's objective of
achieving 'effective and harmonious' copyright laws among all nations. ' 6 2
The court opined that it did not want to send a signal to foreign nations that
the United States thought their laws were inadequate. 63
The
extraterritorial application of the DMCA would send such a signal. The
WCT enabled countries to create their own national laws. It does not allow
countries to create or extend their own national laws abroad. The DMCA
has the potential to conflict with the WCT if it is applied extraterritorially.
Therefore, this potential for conflict with a foreign law should weigh in
favor of the presumption against extraterritoriality.
There DMCA contains no definitive language indicating it even has
potential to apply is extraterritorially. Had the legislature intended to
158144 CONG. REc. S12679,

S12730 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1998) (statement of Sen. Leahy).

159 144 CONG. REC. S 11887, S 11889 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1998) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
160 See Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1097 ("application of the presumption is particularly
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U.S. at 248).
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"overturn over eighty years of consistent jurisprudence on the
extraterritorial reach of the copyright laws[,]" 164 Congress would have
clearly stated their intent to do so. The legislative history further supports
the contention that the DMCA was seen as a protectionist, nationalistic law
that only applied territorially.
Congress' silence regarding the
extraterritoriality of the DMCA should be construed as affirming the
presumption in copyright law.
VII. Conclusion
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act does not apply
extraterritorially. There is a presumption against extraterritorial application
of U.S. copyright law. This presumption can only be overcome if there is
clear congressional intent that the law should be applied extraterritorially.
Congress did not intend the DMCA to apply extraterritorially. On the
contrary, it intended the statute to protect the national interests of the
United States and to be a model for members of the WIPO who had not yet
enacted laws to comply with the WCT.
Extraterritorial conduct is the most important aspect of whether a
specific case deals with extraterritoriality. The case against Elcomsoft is
not the best example of the extraterritorial application of United States law
because the Russian company's sale of the Advanced e-Book Processoris
likely to be seen as territorial. The manner in which the software was sold
on Elcomsoft's website rises to a level of interactivity where Elcomsoft can
be said to have availed itself to the benefits of the United States' market.
What the Elcomsoft case does do is illustrate how the extraterritorial
application of national copyright laws like the DMCA could be an
inevitable, and troubling, consequence of the information age. In these
situations, it is essential to take a hard look at the extraterritorial
implications of the law in question.

64Id. at 1095.

